Mike Burkart

Professor of Finance, London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Mike Burkart - Curriculum Vitae


  • Ph.D., Economics, University of London (LSE), 1996
  • B.A. (lic. rer. pol.), Economics, University of Basel, 1989


  • Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Financial Economics (FE) Programme Area – Research Fellow (2008-); Research Affiliates (1999-2008)
  • European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) –  Member of the Research Committee (2007-2016); Research Fellow (2008-); Research Associate (2004-2008)
  • Financial Markets Group (FMG/LSE); Corporate Finance and Governance Research Programme – Research Associate (2004-)
  • Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics – Associate editor (2017-)

Mike Burkart - Teaching

Applied Contract Theory: Corporate Finance (PhD course)

The course offers a graduate level introduction to corporate finance theory. Rather than providing an exhaustive overview of the field, the course focuses in depth on selected topics, in particular the firms’ financing choices (e.g., capital structure) and the allocation of corporate control. In addition, the course reviews the recent literature on institutional aspects of corporate finance. The material consists of modern game- and contract-theoretic tools applied to corporate finance. The course also aims at training students to use these tools for their own research. To this end, the course allocates time to the discussion of problem sets that the students are asked to solve in advance. The following specific topics will be covered: Moral Hazard Models of Financial Contracting; Asymmetric Information Models of Financial Contracting; Theories of Debt;           Multiple Investors; Transfers of Corporate Control; Debt and Managerial Incentives;  Corporate Control and Ownership.

This course is given within the Doctoral Course Program in Finance by the Swedish House of Finance (SHoF)

Mike Burkart - Publications

Papers can also be downloaded from my SSRN Author Page

  • “Smart Buyers”, with Samuel Lee, Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 5(2), 239-270, (2016)
  • “Signalling to Dispersed Shareholders and Corporate Control”, with Samuel Lee, Review of Economic Studies, 82(3), 922-962, (2015) (formerly circulated under the title “Signalling in Tender Offer Games”)
  • “Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal and the Dual Role of Takeovers”, with Konrad Raff, Review of Finance, 19(4), 1383-1414, (2015)
  • “Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers,” with Denis Gromb, Holger M. Mueller and Fausto Panunzi, Journal of Finance, 69(3), 1129-1164, (2014)
  • “Club-in-The-Club: Reform Under Unanimity”, with Erik Berglöf, Guido Friebel and Elena Paltseva, Journal of Comparative Economics, 40(3), 492–507, (2012)
  • “Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening”, with Christian At and Samuel Lee, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 20(3): 458-476, (2011).
  • “What You Sell Is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts”, with Mariassunta Giannetti and Tore Ellingsen, Review of Financial Studies, 24(4): 1299-1335, (2011).
  • “Widening and Deepening: Reforming the European Union”, with Erik Berglöf, Guido Friebel and Elena Paltseva, American Economic Review, 98(2): 133-137,Papers and Proceedings, (2008).
  • One Share – One Vote: The Theory“, with Samuel Lee, Review of Finance, 12(1),1-49 (2008).
  • “Takeovers”, with Fausto Panunzi, in Handbook of European Financial Markets and Institutions, Freixas, Hartmann & Mayer (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2008).
  • Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia“, with Denis Gromb and Fausto Panunzi, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 162(1), 32-49 (2006).
  • Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection“, with Fausto Panunzi, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 15(1), 1-31 (2006).
  • In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit“, with Tore Ellingsen, American Economic Review, 94(3), 569-590 (2004).
  • “Mandatory Bids, Squeeze-out, Sell-out and the Dynamics of the Tender Offer Process” with Fausto Panunzi, in “Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe”, Ferrarini, Hopt, Winter, & Wymeersch (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2004).
  • Family Firms” with Fausto Panunzi and Andrei Shleifer, Journal of Finance, 58(5), 2173-2201 (2003).
  • European Takeover Regulation” with Erik Berglöf, Economic Policy, 36 (1), 173-213 (2003).
  • Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control“, with Denis Gromb and Fausto Panunzi, Journal of Finance, 55(2), 647-677 (2000).
  • Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders“, with Denis Gromb and Fausto Panunzi, Journal of Political Economy, 106(1), 172-204 (1998).
  • Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm“, with Denis Gromb and Fausto Panunzi, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(3), 693-728 (1997).
  • Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests“, Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1491-1515 (1995).

Mike Burkart - Working Papers

Papers can be downloaded from my SSRN Author Page.

  • “Equity Issuance Methods and Dilution,” with Hongda Zhong
  • “Risk and Leverage Choices in Owner-Controlled Firms,” with Pavle Radicevic and Jin Yu
  • “Why do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the  Absence of Corporate Law”, with Salvatore Miglietta and Charlotte Ostergaard, Winner of the 2018 Aberdeen Standard Investments Prize for the Best ECGI Finance Working Paper
  • “Activism and Takeover”, with Samuel Lee, a first draft circulated under the title “Activist Investors as Brokers of Corporate Control”.
  • “Competition for Flow and Leverage”, with Amil Dasgupta, Financial Markets Group, LSE, DP No 733, formerly circulated under the titles “Activist Funds, Leverage, and Procyclicality” and “Why Hedge Fund Activism is Procyclical?”
  • “Club Enlargement: Early versus Late Admittance”, with Klaus Wallner, Financial Markets Group, LSE, DP No 359